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This purpose of this paper is to explain Macau’s successful pandemic response through an 
analysis of its social, political, and economic landscapes. In particular, it focuses on the 




As mobility is highly restricted during the coronavirus pandemic, digital technologies have 
become central to ongoing social science research. Thanks to videoconferencing programmes 
such as Zoom, Facetime, and WhatsApp, I was able to carry out virtual interviews with 
thirteen local people from different sectors of Macau in July 2020. In addition to in-depth 





This paper argues that the Macau government’s swift and effective coronavirus policies are 
deeply intertwined with the urban fabric and political economy of the city’s casino 
capitalism, which endowed the government with surplus funds and an infrastructure that 
enabled the implementation of an array of strict measures that few other countries could 
afford to subsidize. Among the factors that have led to Macau’s extraordinarily low rates of 
COVID-19 infections and deaths are not only competent leadership but also the public’s high 
compliance with mandatory health measures, the generous benefits and financial support for 
citizens and businesses, and the compulsory quarantine required of all incoming travellers, 
who are lodged in hotel rooms left empty when casino tourists stopped coming. All of these 
measures have been made possible by a political economy backed by the peculiarities of 






While previous studies tend to emphasise the negative impacts of casino capitalism, this 
paper shows how tax revenues and infrastructure from the gambling industry can make a 




Future research could compare the case of Macau with other small but affluent economies 
(ideally, economies that do not depend on the gambling industry) to ascertain the role of 
casino capitalism in building up economic resilience.    
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At the time of writing (17 December 2020), no active cases of COVID-19 have appeared in 
Macau for eight months in a row. Since Macau confirmed its first case in January 2020, it has 
had a total of only forty-six confirmed cases and no deaths. Despite being the poster child in 
the fight against COVID-19, the case of Macau has by and large been ignored while Taiwan, 
South Korea, and Hong Kong are lauded as exemplary, even though the latter two regions 
have recently been hit by the second and fourth waves of infections. The omission of Macau 
is not an isolated incident but a reflection of its long-standing marginalised status in East 
Asia. As culture critic Chin Pang Lei observes, geographical terms such as zhong gang tai 
and liang an san de (which include China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) never encompass 
Macau. Macau has always been ignored. It is a city invisible on all fronts (Lei, 2018).  
 
Still, given Macau’s remarkable performance in containing the virus for a sustained period of 
time, its experience can serve as a point of reference for understanding successful responses 
to COVID-19, especially if we take into account all the risk factors confronted by Macau. 
With a population of 650,000 and an area of only 32.9 square kilometres, Macau is the 
world’s most densely populated region. Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, the city welcomed 
nearly 40 million visitors from China and the rest of the world in 2019 (Macao Government 
Tourism Office, 2019, p. 13). Like Hong Kong, Macau also shares borders with mainland 
China, the original COVID-19 epicentre. In spite of these risk factors, so far there has been 
no community outbreak of the disease. How did Macau manage to keep the virus at bay? 
 
In this article, I answer this question through an analysis of Macau’s social, political, and 
economic landscapes. According to popular stereotypes, Macau people are ‘obedient’ to 
authority and are ready to accept face-covering and social-distancing rules without 
questioning them. As such, Macau’s pandemic success is sometimes held up as a testament to 
the influence of Confucianism and authoritarianism, two of the most common explanations 
for compliance with rules in Asia. In section one, I refute this claim by situating Macau’s 
‘docility’ in the context of its historical and cultural particularities. I argue that their 
willingness to comply with rules is neither a result of Confucian values nor authoritarian rule 
but, rather, a manifestation of the Macau people’s ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977) and their 
‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld, 2005). In section two, I start by discussing how Macau’s 
COVID-19 policies were influenced by its experiences with SARS and Typhoon Hato, since 
research has demonstrated that lessons from past crises led to better preparedness. I then 
show that the measures and interventions put in place by the Macau government are deeply 
intertwined with the urban fabric and political economy of the city’s casino capitalism—‘the 
process of stimulating economic growth through the proliferation of casinos’ (Lo, 2009, p. 
20)—which endowed the government with surplus funds and an infrastructure that enabled 
the implementation of much stricter measures than those other countries could afford to 
subsidize. Among the factors that have led to Macau’s extraordinarily low rates of COVID-
19 infections and deaths are not only the competent leadership behind the Macau 
government’s swift and effective coronavirus response but also the public’s high compliance 
with mandatory health measures, the generous benefits and financial support for citizens and 
businesses, and the compulsory quarantine requirement for all incoming travellers, lodged in 
hotel rooms left empty by casino tourists who stopped coming. All these measures have been 
made possible by a political economy backed by the peculiarities of casino capitalism and its 








As the epicentres of the pandemic shifted from Asia to Europe and the United States, some 
pundits contended that the relative successes of some Asian countries in containing the 
spread of COVID-19 have to do with their unique ‘Asian values’. For example, in an op-ed 
piece in the South China Morning Post, Ian Inkster, an East Asian specialist at SOAS 
University of London, remarked that the strong traditions of Confucianism and Buddhism in 
East Asian societies have given them an edge in the battle against the coronavirus (Inkster, 
2020). Byung-Chul Han, a Korean-born German philosopher and cultural theorist, even went 
so far as to say that people in Asia are ‘less rebellious and more obedient than in Europe’ 
because they ‘have an authoritarian mentality which comes from their cultural tradition [of] 
Confucianism’ (Han, cited in Escobar, 2020). 
 
Since the new coronavirus has become a global pandemic, arguments like these have been 
quickly taken up by mainstream media searching for a plausible explanation for the 
contrasting results between the East and the West (Escobar, 2020; Martin and Walker, 2020; 
Beech, 2020)—not least because such explanations conform to certain Orientalist 
preconceptions. This kind of cultural thesis is a mutation of another equally essentialist but 
more controversial debate. As the world witnessed how decisively China enacted lockdowns, 
‘the uneven performance of many democracies in containing the pandemic and mitigating its 
public health effects rekindles debates about the effectiveness of democratic rule compared to 
authoritarian regimes’ (Croissant, 2020). However, the type of political model is hardly the 
only factor or the determining one that affects a country’s performance in handling COVID-
19. As Rachel Kleinfeld points out, so far there is little evidence to suggest that there is ‘a 
strong correlation between efficacy and regime type. While some autocracies have performed 
well, like Singapore, others have done very poorly, like Iran’ (Kleinfeld, 2020). Most 
importantly, as democratic governments such as New Zealand, Iceland, South Korea, and 
Taiwan demonstrated success in handling the pandemic, myths about the authoritarian 
advantage were also debunked (Kingston, 2020, p. 2). 
 
 
‘Docility’ in an acquaintance society: Habitus and cultural intimacy in Macau 
 
Like Hong Kong, Macau is a hybrid regime that simultaneously has features of democracy 
and autocracy (Ieong and Wang, 2020, pp. 117–118). In this sense, the democratic-versus-
authoritarian debate is not really applicable to these two Special Administrative Regions of 
China. Moreover, although a large part of Macau’s political and cultural landscapes is shaped 
by semi-authoritarian policies under ‘One Country, Two Systems’, the ways that people 
behave are not determined by what political system they live in but are instead manifestations 
of their ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1977) and their ‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld 2005). After all, 
pandemic control in the modern era depends far more on ‘voluntary compliance than on 
government enforcement’ (Kleinfeld 2020). 
 
While Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ refers to disposition and deeply ingrained social 
practices, Herzfeld’s concept of ‘cultural intimacy’ points to ‘the recognition of those aspects 
of an officially shared identity that are considered a source of external embarrassment but that 
nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality’ (Herzfeld, 2005, p. 
7). For many Macau locals, their ‘habitus’ and ‘cultural intimacy’ are embodied in their 
conservatism, their political apathy, and their social docility (Kwong, 2014; Lin, 2017). 
According to a longitudinal study of Macau’s public culture, the desire for social harmony 
was so highly valued that 40% of the respondents said they preferred not to engage in any 
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opposition movements (Kwong, 2014, p. 61). Even though some people are not afraid to 
speak out, hardly any space for real dissent and opposition exists in Macau, given that its civil 
society is dominated by ‘government-backed and pro-Beijing groups and associations’ (Lin, 
2020:61). 
 
In addition to the conservative environment, the Macanese’s docility is sometimes attributed 
to their consensus that Macau is an ‘acquaintance society’ (shuren shehui) in which everyone 
knows one another (Fei, 2001). Whether or not Macau is actually an acquaintance society is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but the fact that many Macau people are convinced that they 
live in an acquaintance society not only increases their aversion to conflicts but also their 
willingness to follow norms and comply with rules. In the context of COVID-19, this quality 
is reflected in the Macanese’s compliance with face-covering and social-distancing mandates 
as well as in their acceptance of many of the government’s decisions. Unlike their 
counterparts in Hong Kong, there was no loud demand for closing borders and no opposition 
to the involvement of testing companies and medical staff from mainland China. There was 
no conspiracy theory circulating in Macau about China covertly collecting DNA samples 
through COVID-19 tests until such a theory hit the headlines in Hong Kong. Of course, this is 
also related to the differences between the societies in the level of political trust in their 
respective governments before the outbreak of COVID-19. After Hongkongers staged a series 
of protests in 2019, political trust in their government sank to a new low. In contrast, Macau 
people were sitting on the fence about their new chief executive and his new cabinet, who 
had taken office just one month before the pandemic began. 
 
In any case, the Macanese’s cooperation with their government’s COVID-19 policies cannot 
be understood as a simple penchant for social harmony. Their cooperation is, in fact, a 
cumulative effect of multiple factors, such as the collective memories of SARS, the impact of 
Typhoon Hato, economic support from the government, and a relatively spacious living home 
environment, all of which have contributed to strong adherence to social-distancing 
regulations by the Macau people.  
 
 
II. COVID-19 and governmentality in Macau 
 
Learning from the past: SARS and Typhoon Hato 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic not only unveils a society’s underlying problems, it also points to 
‘the broader question of the relationship between governments and their constituent citizens’ 
(Meyer and Sundqvist, 2020). According to Meyer and Sundqvist, there have been two main 
models of public health governance, but COVID-19 pandemic policies belong to neither. In 
the first model of governance, officials and experts are actively in charge while citizens 
remain passive. In the second model, citizens are critical of the government’s decisions and 
demand to be involved in the production of knowledge and risk management. Meyer and 
Sundqvist argue that the current pandemic is a hybrid of the two models. On the one hand, 
governments expect their citizens to obey to the social-distancing rules (model 1); on the 
other, citizens have learned to become proactive and vigilant (model 2). To fight the 
pandemic, ‘the government is obliged to delegate an important part of the management of the 
crisis to citizens’ and rely on them to ‘act “responsibly”’ (Meyer and Sundqvist, 2020). 
 
While this has been a steep learning curve for many countries in the West, people in China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore already went through it once before in 2003. Since then, 
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a culture of ‘responsibilisation’ has taken root in these societies, and handwashing and using 
face masks have become regular practices. Increasingly, studies have suggested that societies 
that are having the greatest success in containing the virus are the ones that were worst 
affected by the SARS epidemic in 2003 (Graham-Harrison, 2020; Kingston, 2020, p. 3). ‘The 
memory of that crisis may have led to better preparedness, in government and among the 
population, and to a greater willingness among people to comply with restrictions on 
movement and daily life to prevent the spread of infection’ (Graham-Harrison, 2020; see also 
Kingston, 2020, and other articles in this special issue). 
 
Although Macau had only one recorded case of SARS back in 2003, the pain of witnessing 
the staggering death tolls in Hong Kong and China left a mark in Macanese memories. 
Therefore, when the first case of COVID-19 eventually arrived in the city, both the 
government and the general populace took it seriously and acted without delay.1  
 
Besides SARS, the traumatic experience of Typhoon Hato in 2016, which caused significant 
damage to Macau, also heightened the government’s sense of crisis, spurring it to take 
decisive actions during the early stages of the pandemic. According to a civil servant working 
for the Municipal Affairs Bureau, the Macau government was able to assure the public from 
the start that there was a sufficient stock of protective gear because the country had been 
accumulating masks, hazmat suits, gloves, and disinfectants ever since Typhoon Hato in case 
another emergency struck. Macau’s case indicates that the government’s response to the 
pandemic was conditioned not only by its past experience of SARS but also on lessons 
learned from previous disasters of an entirely different kind than diseases.  
 
 
Face masks and self-isolation: An embodiment of privileges 
 
In February 2020, Macau’s Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture urged residents to 
‘control their own feet’ by staying at home. In the same press conference, she insisted that 
closing the borders with China was not an option for Macau. Earlier that month, medical staff 
in Hong Kong had gone on a strike to demand that Carrie Lam close Hong Kong’s borders 
with China. Although both places have similar concerns about the risk of continuous cross-
border movement, there were hardly any objections in Macau. Overall, Macau residents have 
been very cooperative with the government’s strategy to fight the disease.  
 
Katrina,2 a dual resident of Hong Kong and Macau, felt that Macanese self-discipline and 
pragmatic attitude have helped them win the battle against COVID-19. ‘Macau people don’t 
tend to politicise things. Most people don’t think there is any ulterior motive when the 
government asked us to stay at home,’ she said. At the time of the interview, Katrina was 
stranded in her Macau home while Hong Kong underwent another spike of community 
infection. She complained that many Hong Kong people were not as ‘disciplined’ as the 
Macanese because many of them defied the government’s advice to stay at home. ‘The Hong 
Kong government, of course, has many problems. But I fear that Hongkongers are opposing 




1 As early as 5 January 2020, the Macau government formed an interdepartmental taskforce for what it called 
‘pneumonia of unknown cause’.  
2 To protect individual identities and their confidentiality, I use pseudonyms for all of my interlocutors. 
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Are the Macanese really more disciplined than their Hong Kong counterparts? Or, as the 
stereotype goes, are they really more obedient to authority? In a previous section, I discussed 
this issue on a theoretical level with references to the concepts of ‘habitus’, ‘cultural 
intimacy’, and the perception of living in an acquaintance society. When I directed this 
question to my interlocutors, their answers were far more down to earth. While they agreed 
that political conformity is an indisputable fact, they disagreed that Macau people are more 
compliant with COVID-19 rules. Yasmin, a journalist and freelance tour guide, said she has 
not been wearing face masks since the peak passed in April because she felt very safe in 
Macau. Janet is a librarian in a public library. She complained to me that many elderly people 
had ignored the face-mask rule and come to the library without following the required Macao 
Health Code.3 ‘I think you can’t really generalise to say that Macau people are more 
disciplined than Hong Kong people. It depends on the person,’ Janet insisted. Carmen, a desk 
researcher who was able to work from home for a couple of months, believed that it was the 
government’s coherent and consistent measures that made it feasible for many Macau people 
to stay at home. When the government ordered a two-week closure of all casinos, it resulted 
in a series of knock-on effects. First, it removed the major incentive for tourists (from China) 
to come to Macau, which made it unnecessary for Macau officials to close the border with the 
mainland – a sensitive issue that required the government to balance the interests of multiple 
parties.4 Furthermore, since a large percentage of the Macau workforce is employed by the 
gaming industry (Lo, 2009, p. 25; Sheng and Gu, 2018, p. 76), a two-week closure allowed 
most people to stay home and work from there, which helped prevent the spread of 
infections. Together with the closures of nurseries, schools, and universities, these measures 
brought Macau to a temporary halt without an official lockdown. 
 
Unlike Katrina, who thought Hongkongers’ going-out and eating-out behaviours were signs 
of a ‘lack of discipline’, Carmen was sympathetic with them: 
 
I know that being able to stay at home is a privilege. Not every job allows you to 
do that. I really enjoyed my stay-at-home time. I was able to work and relax in the 
comfort of my home, with air-conditioning twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week, because the Macau government has waived the electricity and water 
charges for residential users from March to May. 
 
But I couldn’t imagine staying at home the entire time if I lived in a subdivided 
flat. As you know, apartments in Macau are generally a lot bigger than those in 
Hong Kong. It’s easier for us to cook at home so we don’t need to eat out. But 
what about people who live in subdivided flats in Hong Kong? What about those 
who still need to go to work and don’t have the conditions to cook at home? It’s 
very sad to see Hong Kong people eating bento boxes on the street! 
 
The guaranteed access to face masks in Macau at a time of a global shortage of personal 
protective equipment magnifies how privileged the Macanese are. By late January, the Macau 
government rolled out a rationing programme for surgical masks, which enabled local 
 
3 The Macao Health Code is similar to the health code system developed by the Chinese government in response 
to COVID-19. For more about the health code system in China, see Courtney (2020). 
4 To meet the demand of Macau’s growing economy, a large number of imported workers, mostly from 
mainland China, were recruited to Macau over the past decade (Sheng and Gu, 2018, p. 74). The majority of 
these migrant workers live in Zhuhai and commute to Macau for work every day. Some are key workers who 
deliver essential frontline services. Therefore, on the issue of closing borders, Macau not only needs to consider 
politics but also practicalities, such as where migrant workers would be housed if the borders were closed.  
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residents and anyone holding a valid work permit in Macau to buy ten masks for $8 
Macanese pataca (MOP) every ten days. Kevin, a consultant surgeon at the Hospital Centre 
S. Januario, commended this scheme: ‘Even though we live in an age of advanced science 
and technology, the most effective ways to prevent infectious diseases are still handwashing, 
wearing masks, and social distancing.’ Meanwhile, Hongkongers were seen queuing outside 
pharmacies only to be told that all masks were sold out. Several of my interviewees recalled 
sending boxes of masks to their Hong Kong friends and relatives. One of them said, ‘The 
Hong Kong government is so incompetent that even my “blue-ribbon” relatives hate them 
now’.5 
 
Competent leadership has certainly played a pivotal role in the coordination of testing, 
tracing, imposing quarantines, controlling borders, and distributing face masks. Ho Iat Seng, 
the new Chief Executive of Macau since December 2019, has been praised for his 
competence in crisis management. Several of my interviewees said they felt lucky that 
COVID-19 hit Macau after Ho’s predecessor Chui Sai-On left office: ‘Macau people would 
be in deep trouble if Chui were in charge.’ Despite having a PhD in Public Health from the 
University of Oklahoma, Chui lost support and trust from the public over a number of 
controversies during his tenure. Most notably, he was severely criticised for his slow reaction 
to Typhoon Hato, resulting in ten deaths and two hundred injuries. Ho’s performance makes a 
sharp contrast with not only his predecessor but also with Hong Kong’s Chief Executive 
Carrie Lam. 
 
However, one downside of emphasising the role of competence is that instead of examining 
structural issues, the focus on leadership reinforces the legitimacy of an executive-dominated 
political system that was designed to bring ‘economic prosperity and political stability [to 
Macau] without democracy’ (Ieong, 2020, p. 5).6 This has led to fears that an administration 
heavily dominated by the executive branch would further reduce Macau’s already shrinking 
civic space. Indeed, for the first time in twenty years, the government banned open-air 
photographic exhibitions and mass vigils for commemorating the victims of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square crackdown, claiming that these gatherings would pose a threat to public 
health. 
 
In the final section, I will further unpack why the Macau government was able to do what it 
did. I argue that the Macau government would not have been so decisive nor its quarantine 
measures so effective in keeping COVID-19 rates low if its political economy were not based 
on casino capitalism, which not only endowed Macau with a considerable budget surplus but 
also an urban fabric woven with plenty of empty hotels for self-isolation and mandatory 
quarantines for incoming travellers. 
 
 
III. Casino capitalism: an accidental boon to pandemic containment?  
 
If one only looks at how people conduct their everyday life, Macau seems to have already 
adapted to the ‘new normal’. So-called staycations are booming and restaurants are getting 
busier and busier, with some of them being fully booked during weekends or even weeks in 
 
5 Wearing a blue ribbon has been a symbol used by supporters of the government and the police force during 
Hong Kong’s democratic movement.  
6 According to Fong, ‘The notion of executive dominance could be defined as the executive holding a dominant 
position vis-à-vis the legislature over the legislative process, i.e., the capacity of the executive to control the 
legislative agenda and get its proposal accepted by the legislature’ (2014, p. 5). 
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advance. However, a closer look at the numbers reveals that Macau’s economic activities are 
far from having returned to the pre-COVID-19 ‘normalcy’. According to the Statistics and 
Census Service, Macau’s gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by 67.8% for the second 
quarter of 2020 (Statistics and Census Service, 2020, p. 1). Gaming revenue sank to an all-
time low. In June 2020, Macau recorded a gaming revenue of $716 million MOP, a 97% 
decline from the same month the year before (Macau News, 2020a). Despite this dramatic 
drop, middle-class Macanese have yet to feel the full impact of the economic hit. ‘Some 
industries are definitely hit harder, and some people are more affected than others,’ admitted 
Yasmin. ‘But compared to other cities in the world, the sense of precarity is still very 
minimal in Macau because Macau is a very rich city.’ 
 
Fernando, an economist working for a government bureau, believes that the delayed sense of 
economic vulnerability may be due to Macau’s low unemployment rate and the generous, 
timely financial-support measures. For example, each Macau residents have been issued a 
$13,000 MOP consumption subsidy (a.k.a. ‘spending vouchers’) and free health vouchers 
since the start of the pandemic. While eligible employees and self-employed workers are 
entitled to cash support, small- and medium-sized enterprises can benefit from a combination 
of tax break, tax exemptions, subsidies, and interest-free loans. These forms of economic 
support would not have been possible if Macau had not accumulated a considerable surplus 
of tax revenues from the gaming industry over the past two decades. As Chief Executive Ho 
Iat Seng admitted, ‘Thanks to the fiscal surplus from previous years, the government’s 
reserves can cushion the economic disruptions brought by COVID-19.’ With an abundant 
fiscal reserve, the government had less to worry about when imposing draconic measures like 
closing the casinos. This in turn has made residents feel that the government is committed to 
putting their lives before the economy.  
 
In contrast to many countries, where tax bases have declined dramatically in recent decades 
(Erikson, 2020, p. 441), Macau has tens of billions of unused casino taxes sitting in its 
government coffers (Master, 2017). Since the Chinese government freed up Macau’s gaming 
market in 2002, Macau has surpassed Las Vegas to become the largest gambling centre in the 
world. Subsequently, local service sectors such as real estate, hotels, restaurants, and retail 
have also profited from the gaming industry boom (Sheng and Gu, 2018, p. 79). In 2013, 
Macau hit an all-time high in gaming revenue, totalling $360.8 billion MOP, which is ‘seven 
times that of the Las Vegas Strip’ (Ngan, 2020, p. 11). Even though the gaming revenues 
have gone down slightly in recent years, the figures are still about four times that of Las 
Vegas, accounting for more than 80% of government revenues in Macau (Ngan, 2020, p. 11). 
This is because licensed casino operators in Macau are required to ‘pay 35 percent casino tax 
on gross gaming revenues and not less than 2 percent to a public foundation for the 
promotion of cultural, social, economic, educational, scientific, academic and charity 
projects’ (Lo, 2009, p. 25). This policy has endowed the Macau government’s coffers with a 
sizeable reserve. According to the Macau Monetary Authority, by the end of 2019, the 
financial reserves of Macau stood at $580.75 billion MOP (Macau News, 2020b). 
 
In addition to their financial contributions, the casinos’ integrated hotels and resorts have also 
played a crucial role in preventing the spread of COVID-19 by serving as ‘quarantine hotels’. 
Since late February, anyone who has been to an area with a high incidence of coronavirus 
infections prior to their entry into Macau has been required to undergo quarantine and 
medical observation for fourteen days at a designated hotel. In terms of cost, the fee for room 
and board is waived for Macau residents, while nonlocals are asked to pay $5,600 MOP for 
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their two-week quarantine. By the end of May, the Macau government had spent $70 million 
MOP on quarantine hotels.  
 
Overall, Macau locals are pleased with results of the quarantine arrangements. Community 
members consider the direct transfer of returning travellers from checkpoints to quarantine 
hotels to be a safer option than self-isolation at home. Those who are under quarantine are 
also satisfied with the experience. ‘The hotel was clean and I got three meals a day, all free of 
charge. I have nothing to complain about,’ said Jenny, a student who returned to Macau in 
March from her boarding school in the UK. 
 
In a recent commentary published in Nature Human Behaviour, medical anthropologist Susan 
Erikson argues that too much dependence on the private sector weakened the US’s pandemic 
response (Erikson, 2020, p. 441). The case of Macau is perhaps one of the few 
counterexamples of this statement. While tax revenues from the gambling industry provide 
economic relief to Macau during this challenging time, the casino hotels serve as a ‘spatial 
buffer’ or ‘first line of defence’ against potential carriers of COVID-19. This positive aspect 
is worth exploring, as past studies tend to emphasise the negative impacts of the gaming 
industry on the host community (Chang, Lai and Wang, 2010; Hannigan, 2007; Simpson, 
2016; Chu, 2015). Future research could compare the case of Macau with other small but 
affluent economies (ideally, economies that do not depend on the gambling industry) to 
ascertain the role of casino capitalism in building up economic resilience.7 Nonetheless, the 
side effects of casino capitalism should not be overlooked. In Macau, even though many 
people’s livelihoods depend on casino tourism, the huge influx of tourists, the overinflated 
house prices, and the erosion of the city’s once-tranquil small-town appeal (Lei 2020, p. 24) 
have triggered many grievances among the general populace. This is the contradiction of 
‘casino capitalism’ (Lo, 2009), a double-edged sword that can either widen inequality or 
equip the government with the necessary resources to build infrastructure and expand social 
services. Thus, when COVID-19 was poised to spill over into Macau from China and other 
ravaged countries, threatening the health and lives of its citizens, the government already had 
the funds and infrastructure to expand its repertoire of health measures far beyond what any 
other country could do. As a result, Macau’s rates of COVID-19 infections and deaths have 
been and remain extraordinarily low. Ho Iat Seng’s cabinet has proved its capacity to handle 
a global pandemic, but it remains to be seen if his administration will make better, wiser use 
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